Religion in Taiwan

In order to understand the role that religion has played in Taiwan's history, it is necessary to take certain things into consideration.  They are:

1.  Religion, from a Judaeo-Christian standpoint, is considered humankind's attempt to reach and understand God.

2.  The Judaeo-Christian tradition purports to be God reaching out to humankind through self-disclosure.

3.  Liberation Theology seeks to discover the liberating elements in all religions.

The world in which the original inhabitants of Taiwan lived, was filled with spirits.  Although the tribal groups had differing religious customs and beliefs, they were united in their traditional religion that all of life was controlled by spirit activity. Spirits existed in all of nature-the trees, mountains, rivers, rocks, wind, and the earth.  For the most part, these were evil.  They might be thought of as "spirits" or "gods."  Most prominent among the spirits were the ancestral spirits. Depending on the good or bad conduct of the departed one, these spirits could be beneficial or evil.  People tried to communicate with them and offered sacrifices to them (Ralph Covell, Pentecost on the Hills of Taiwan.  Pasadena, California: Hope Publishing House, 1998, p, 20.)

The ancestral rites varied according to the customs of each group.  The Paiwan and Rukai had ancestral houses and men's houses, and in the latter could be found ancestral statutes.  In some literature, these two houses are referred to as "temples (C. S, Yang, "Animism in the Mountain Tribes of Taiwan." Southeast Asia Journal of Theology, April 1969, p, 29)"

The Paiwan had three levels of ancestral figures: the "grandfather" who must be recognized as the most important for every ritual; the "father" who was worshiped chiefly for harvest and sowing festivals, and the "son," who was responsible for rituals associated with warfare.  Paiwan ancestral rites were done as needed, annually or in five and six-year cycles.  (Yao-Te-hsiung, Formosan Aboriginal Culture Village.  Nantou Count: Aboriginal Culture Village Tourism Co. Ltd, 1987, p. 138)

The Tayal and Sediq also had ancestral rites, but these were not associated with special ritual places or with any specific physical representation of the spirits.  As with other tribes, they had special terms to refer to the spirits.  With the Tayal, the term was "rutux," and with the Sediq, it was either the general word for "spirit (utox)," or the word for "wind (bighorn)." (Covell, p. 20).

The Sediq term "utux," has a wide meaning.  It referred to the spirits of the natural world, to ancestors, to a being who knew all about human conduct., and to what was seen in a dream.  If the words good or bad were used before "utux" as modifiers, he meaning was good luck or bad luck.  No terms existed for an evil spirit, only a term meaning "a spirit to be feared (Ibid, pp. 29-21)."

The Amis used pictures, rather than statutes, to remind them of their ancestors.  The Tsou put the old clothes of their ancestors in a basket and made sacrifices to it (Ibid, p. 21).

Creator Gods

With the Tayal and Sediq, if the terms "rutux" or "utux" are not used with modifiers, the indication is that they refer to the ancestor(s), then they indicate a "high god."  They believe that this one controls the entire universe, including human beings.  He knows about all the inequities that humans face.  Even if there are wicked people who mistreat others, the victims are not to retaliate because the "spirit above" knows about this.  He will take revenge either through judgement now or in the future upon the perpetrators of evil (From a text by Wiran Takoh on that which he heard from his father on the "utux)."

The Sediq and Tayal have no clear concept of creation.  And when people die, if all conditions have been met, it is to the home of the rutux or utox that they go (Covell, p, 21).

The Puyuma believe that there is a creator god who gives a soul to human beings and that at death, the soul returns to this one.  It is not known where this god came from or whether he is personal or impersonal (Yang, "Animism in Mountain Tribes, pp 29-31)."

The Yami have a complex hierarchy of divine beings.  Various "gods" exist on the highest levels as well as humans who have taken on divine qualities.  Some of these deities have specific names such as Nunurao, Shipariud, Shibairai, and Shinunmanuri.  Each has responsibility for a particular sphere of human existence.  Within this system there are no creator gods or those who exercise retribution on the human race (Arundel Del Re, Creation Myths of the Formosan Natives.  Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, n.d. pp 53-71).

The Amis also recognized special deities as a part of their religion, with no clear boundaries between "gods" or "spirits."  An exact listing of these is difficult, since names differed from district to district.  The most common of the deities was Malatau, who was created, but yet had the power to bring sickness and death.  Tsidar was the sun goddess and Bolal was the moon god (Robert Donnell Mc call, "Conversion, Acculturation, and Revitalization: The History of Fataan Amis Presbyterian Church."  Unpublished D. Miss. Dissertation, Fuller Theological Seminary, 1995, pp.67-68).

In the hierarchy of the gods, the Amis placed these three at the top.  Just below them were the Tatakusan, a generic name for all of the ancestral spirits.  Those responsible for worship and the rituals were the Cikawasai or shamans, and the Kakitaan or priestly families (Ch'en Chi-lu and Michael Cove, "An Investigation of the Ami Religion."  Quarterly Journal of the Taiwan Museum, vol. 7, pp. 249).

The interaction of these several gods was best seen in the ancient "ilisin" ritual, the Amis New Year Festival.  The chief priest, the priestly families, and members of the senior and junior grades were the most active participants in this ceremony intended to purify and renew the worshiping community (Covell,p. 22).

Religious Intermediaries

In their practice of traditional religion, all of the original inhabitants depended on the mediation of the shamans.  Usually younger or older females, shamans were thought to have developed such an intimate relationship with the spirits that their ecstatic dancing, crying, and ritualistic acts could overcome any evil or produce the desired blessing.  On the negative side, this included cure from illness, overcoming misfortune caused by a broken taboo, casting out evil spirits, praying for rain and interpreting bad dreams.  On the positive side, this included divination or predicting the future, presiding over the various agricultural festivals to insure and give thanks for good crops, the erecting and finishing of houses, boats, and community buildings, and the celebration of enemy heads.  They sometimes were asked to help interpret birds, although the common people learned the meaning of certain bird calls or flight in a certain direction.  Proper understanding of this determined whether or not the men would go hunting, whether omens were favorable for taking a head, or whether some type of danger was lurking (Ibid.).

In these various activities, the shamans used magic and often were in a state of ecstasy. Their function was not that usually associated with a priestly figure who was not possessed with the spirits to the same extent.  They depended more upon experience, attention to ritual procedure, and their reputation within the community (Eugene A. Nida and William Smalley, Introducing Animism. New York: Friendship Press, 1959, p. 29).

The frenzied activity of the priests and priestesses was that which most impressed some of the 17th-century Dutch missionaries when they first visited the "raw savages" of the high mountains.  They reported that" "Temples are everywhere to be met with, there being one for every sixteen houses: and while all other nations have priests to perform religious ceremonies, this is done by priestesses called "inibs."  The inib sacrifice the heads of the pigs and deer, which they are accustomed first to boil somewhat, and then, to place before their gods with some rice, strong drink.  Thereupon, two of the priestesses rise and call upon their gods with a horrible shouting and screaming, so furious that their eyes stand out of their heads as they foam at the mouth, causing them to look as if they were either demon-possessed or suffering from madness.  On recovering, the two priestesses climb to the roof of the temple and stand, one at each end, calling upon their gods in a violent way.  Every article of clothing is now laid aside, and they appear stark naked before their idols, to honor them and move them to answer prayers by the exhibition of, and continual touching of their female parts (William Campbell, "Formosa," in James Hastings, ed.  Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.  New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1995, vol. 6, p. 84).

The Sediq did not regard the shaman as highly as did many of the other tribes.  In fact, the village chief made some of the sacrifices to the streams, mountains, or trees.  The shamans were known to all.  They were not selected as such, but gained recognition by their success.  Each village had two or three families referred to as "mhoni."  All within the family-not merely the females-had this power.  The mhoni cast their spells, not face, but by putting a curse on a person from a distance.  If the people within a community knew a person or a family to be a mhoni, they killed them.  Often if a person were suspected of being mhoni, the potential accuser would come and say "Put a curse on me."  In this situation, the mhoni would not dare do anything, since by putting a curse on the accuser, if that person should die, the others would now that a person was a mhoni and kill him (Material obtained from Sediq Informants).

Religion is thriving in Taiwan.  Political candidates sometimes secure their promises by beheading a cock, thus making their oath directly to the gods.  New temples have popped up everywhere; many are unlicensed, but the government has problems closing them because no workers are willing to tear them down.  Buddhist clergy often preach for hours on television, and movies about various gods and temples are frequent.  These examples attest to the health of religion in Taiwan and to the ways in which it is embedded in everyday life (Robert Weller, "Identity and Social Change in Taiwanese Religion," in Taiwan: A New History, Murray Rubinstein, ed.  Armonk, New York:  M.E, Sharp, Inc., 1999, p. 340).

The embeddedness of religious practice in Taiwanese life has linked it closely to changing notions of identity.  The close ties among religion, kinship, and community have made temples and rituals an arena in which we can see historical changes in contending notions of self and society, especially in the absence of a higher religious authority that could attempt to impose such an interpretation.  Religious practice has both shaped and been shaped by Taiwan's history, and speaks especially clearly about ethnic identities over time, the changing nature of social marginality, and the current dilemmas of modernity (Ibid.).

Contemporary Taiwanese History

This essay covers the history of Taiwan from 1895 under Japanese rule to the present.

After many centuries of being occupied and ruled by various countries (Chinese, Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch), Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 at the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War.  This sudden act ushered in a fifty-one year period of colonial rule that is now undergoing a major reassessment.  Up until recently, appraisals of the Japanese period generally reflected two contrary frame of reference: a positive perspective highlighting the achievements brought about under a colonial regime, and an anti-imperialist orientation featuring the harsh Japanese rule and the hardships suffered by the island's population (George W. Barclay, Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954, pp. 6-8).

Sinophiles and exponents of Chinese nationalism subscribed to the latter view in keeping with their anti-Japanese sentiment.  This led to a highly biased historiography by which resistance to colonial rule was emphasized and constructive measures were often slighted or ignored. In post-colonial Taiwan, after the colony's retrocession to China in 1945, the Japanese period tended to be discredited as a dark age or as a mere cipher wedged between Taiwan's late Chi' ing and Nationalist eras, when Chinese mainlander governance prevailed (Harold J. Lamley, "Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism" in Rubinstein, p. 202).

Japan's annexation of Taiwan was not the result of long-range planning.  Instead, this action came about by way of strategy adopted during the war with China and diplomacy carried out in the spring of 1895.  Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi's "southern  strategy," supportive of Japanese navy design, paved the way for the occupation of the P'eng-hu islands in late March as a prelude to the takeover of Taiwan.  Soon thereafter, while peace negotiations were still in progress, Ito and his minister of foreign affairs, stipulated that both Taiwan and P'eng Hu were to be ceded by imperial China (Edward I-Te Chen, "Japan's Decision to Annex Taiwan: A Study of Ito-Mutso Diplomacy, 1894-95," Journal of Asian Studies, p. 37, no. 1, November 1977, 66-67).

The acquisition of Taiwan marked an historic occasion for Japan.  An island province and its inhabitants had been wrested from China and the status of a colonial power achieved.  Moreover, extraterritorial privileges in China had been gained as an outcome of a war highlighted by impressive military and naval victories.  In East Asia, at least, Japan now seemed to have almost gained parity with the Western powers that it could continue to emulate, boasting modern armaments, and overseas empires (Marious Jensen, "The Menji State: 1868-1912," Modern East Asia:  Essays in Interpretation.  James B. Crowley, ed., New York: Harcourt Brace, and the World, 1970, p. 115).

The vicissitudes of colonialism were such that the Taiwanese never had control over their own destiny.  In 1895, Taiwan had been ceded to Japan, much to the consternation of the inhabitants, and painful years of resistance had ensued. Thereafter, the Taiwanese were not granted home rule, and allowed only a limited measure of self-government.  They were not appointed to high office in the imperial government.  In 1945, when Taiwan was ceded to China by Japan, the Taiwanese once more came to governed by "outsiders," only this time they would dominated by the Kuomintang and mainland Chinese instead of by Japanese authorities (Lamley in Rubinstein, p. 248).

Japan's fifty years of colonial rule over Taiwan ended on October 25, 1945.  At a brief ceremony in Taipei, the island returned to China, then governed by Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalist Party.  The simple transfer of sovereignty accomplished in a single day, however, belies the complexity and contradictions of the 1945 -1948 period, which blended a troubled decolonization with an abortive reintegration into China (Steven Phillips, Taiwanese Political Aspirations Under Nationalist Chinese Rule, 1945-1948, in Rubinstein, p, 276).

Even after 1945, the colonial experience remained an important factor in determining the course and content of political activity in Taiwan.  The Taiwanese relied upon their collective memory of Japanese rule to create frameworks for evaluating and interacting with the Nationalist government (Steven Harrell, Ploughshare Village: Culture and Context in Taiwan.  Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982, pps. 117-128).

Reintegration of Taiwan into China, which had ruled the island from the 1600's until 1895, was no simpler than decolonization.  Although the mainland, sometimes called the "motherland," was the source of most of the island's population, the legacy of Japanese rule assured that reintegration was marked by ambiguity, and then conflict.  Furthermore, both Taiwan and mainland China had changed so much between 1895 and 1945-politically, socially, and economically-that the retrocession was less the restorations of historical ties than the attempt to forge an entirely new relationship (Phillips in Rubinstein, p. 276).

Because of their limited knowledge of Taiwan, well-justified animosity toward all things Japanese, and the pressure of reconstruction and civil war on the mainland, the Nationalists sought tight control over the economic and political life of the island.  The central government delegated to a provincial administration staffed almost exclusively with the mainlanders.  As they had during the colonial era, the Taiwanese attempted to maximize the island's autonomy within a larger political entity, in this case, the Republic of China (Ibid).).

Decolonization and reintegration began with the interregnum, two months of uncertainty between Japan's surrender in mid-August 1945 and the Nationalist takeover in late October.  From late 1945 through mid 1946, the Nationalists attempted to solidify their control over the island, causing considerable hardship and increasing tensions between the provincial administration and the population.  The Taiwanese, even as they broke with their past in the process of decolonization, consciously and subconsciously recalled Japanese rule as they navigated their way through this extraordinarily difficult period.  Islanders wrestled two interrelated problems: Where did they fit in the nation of China?  What was their place in the Nationalist state?  To many, China appeared chaotic and backward-a potential drain on the island's resources and a threat to stability.  The Nationalist state failed to meet many standards of acceptable governance that the Taiwanese had formed under the previous regime.  Increasingly, they saw the mainland government and its representatives on the island as new, yet less competent colonial rulers.  Reintegration became to many of them, recolonization.  Taiwanese criticism of the state mirrored calls for expanded provincial autonomy (Ibid., p. 277).

In early 1947, simmering tensions between state and society exploded in what became known as the 2-28 incident.  Taiwanese quickly took control of the island from an ill-prepared provincial administration.  Although the elite did not lead the uprising, they used the opportunity to demand a large role in governing the island and controlling its resources. After a week of tense negotiations, military reinforcements arrived from the mainland, crushing all opposition, massacring thousands of the island's inhabitants.  The process of decolonization made a quantum leap forward as those who had invoked the memory of the Japanese era to justify political reform were killed or cowed into silence.  After the incident, the state dominated debate over Taiwan's place in China and the Nationalist Party.  Subsequent changes in the political and economic spheres came from and through the regime, not as a result of the Taiwanese themselves.  The high point of reintegration was 1948.  By the end of that year, the collapsing Nationalist regime had retreated to the island.  Communist victory and US support for Chiang's regime assured that by 1950, Taiwan was isolated more completely from the mainland than at any time under Japanese rule (Ibid.).

Linguistic differences resulting from colonial rule became a point of conflict between the Taiwanese and the new administration.  Over fifty years of spoken Japanese had come to replace the common Chinese dialects among the better educated.  In response, the Nationalist Party struggled to spread the use of better Mandarin Chinese, literally "national language."  In April 1946, the government established a committee for the promotion of Mandarin.  While most Taiwanese enthusiastically studied their new language-whether out of patriotism, drive for profit in the Chinese market, release of curiosity stifled by the Japanese, or simple self interest is difficult to say-there were several problems with the government's approach.  The state vastly overestimated the speed at which the Taiwanese could learn Mandarin well enough to discuss political issues, and read and write materials. This prove especially troublesome for those seeking positions in the provincial administration.  Even in the Provincial Consultative Assembly meetings of 1946, translation was required as so few representatives could speak "standard Mandarin (Ibid, p. 285).

In debates carried out through factions, the press and representative assemblies, the Taiwanese linked the colonial legacy with their immediate concerns over Nationalist rule.  Perceptions of the provincial administration's corruption and ineptitude, defined by standards derived from the experience of Japanese rule, motivated a drive for reform.  The goal of the reform-greater self-government-represented a return to a political movement from the pre-retrocession era.  Only by showing that they had not been "tainted" by Japanese influence, could the Taiwanese justify their participation in political activity or criticism of the government.  Many Taiwanese faced the dilemma of reconciling pride in their Chinese cultural background with the reality of Japanese military power, institutional efficiency, and economic modernization (Ibid, p. 288).

The February 28 incident epitomized the collision between decolonization and reintegration.  The drive for self-government linked these two complicated processes.  Taiwanese concerns, amorphous at the time of retrocession, then increasingly specific and linked to criticism of Nationalist policies in 1946, finally exploded in concrete anti-state action in early 1947.  Islanders briefly overthrew the provincial administration and attempted to change their relationship with the central government.  The Nationalists reacted brutally, crushing the island's elite as a political force, capable of operating outside the mainlander-dominated state, i.e. the Kuomintang (Ibid, p. 293).

The state eventually cleared a path for innovative policies to promote development that is today characterized as the "economic miracle."  Few prominent Taiwanese would dare oppose measures such as rent reduction and land reform, even if they did not think it was in their best economic interests.  In the political realm, the Nationalists blocked any change in the relationship between the state and the Taiwanese society.  Restrictions on civil society grew in scope and severity as Chiang Kai-Shek and the remnants of his defeated army retreated to the island, beginning a "White Terror" in 1949.  Thousands of Taiwanese and recently arrived mainlanders were killed , arrested, or intimidated for their alleged ties to the Communists.  The Korean War and resulting support for Chiang's regime was the final step in solidifying the relationship between Taiwanese and the Nationalist government, creating a pattern that would exist for almost forty years.  Although mainlanders represented a minority on the island, the Nationalist government had no fear of overthrow by the Taiwanese.  It was not until the 1980's that the Taiwanese could safely advocate a political agenda of their own.  Economic development and resulting change enlarged a middle class that increasingly pressured the state for more democratic reform.  Also, Taiwanese gradually came to dominate the Nationalist Party and government from the inside-thus making both institutions more amenable to the interests of the island's people (Ibid., pp. 302-303).

Two major things have happened in Taiwan after the time that has been mentioned in this essay.  In 1971, Taiwan was for all effects and purposes, "unseated" at the United Nations, in that the position formerly occupied by Taiwan in this world organization, was now ceded to the People's Republic of China.  It was a very disappointing experience for the Taiwanese nation, as in effect, this action led to the "One China (including Taiwan) Policy," meaning that there is only one China whose government is based in Bejing.   In a very indirect manner, this also meant that the People's Republic of China had the right to claim absolute sovereignty over the island of Taiwan.  This matter is still unsettled in the international community.

In 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) became the dominant political entity in Taiwan.  Since then, the people of Taiwan have lived under conditions of democracy under a party which has not imposed itself on the people, but which rather, represents the interests of the majority of the people of Taiwan.  Only time will tell if the KMT returns to power or tries to influence the DPP in order to pressure Taiwan to return to the orbit of the People's Republic of China.